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(X) Uriel Schachter - Former Israeli national security advisor Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror was interviewed recently on Ha'aretz's podcast. These were his main points: Let's start with the big picture: The war we are in was forced upon us on Oct. 7. Since then, the State of Israel has been managing it very wisely. First and foremost, by not being tempted by all sorts of proposals to expand the war simultaneously on several fronts. In the first stage, we dismantled Hamas as a military organization. It no longer exists as an organization, but it does exist as a bunch of cells that still operate in Gaza. Then, a little earlier than planned, we embarked on a war against Hizbullah. The Pager Operation turned out to be a great success, and almost all of Hizbullah's ability to fire at us was neutralized, and its leadership was destroyed. Following the fall of Hizbullah - and the weakness of Iran which was revealed in our attack in Iran in October - the Syrian regime fell. This happened because the forces around Syria realized that Assad was weak and sent the rebels to finish the job there. Finally, Iran gave us the opportunity to attack it, because it directly attacked us twice. As a result, we went on a very, very successful 12-day war in Iran. Today there is no central force in Hamas that is capable of managing the forces, gathering intelligence on the State of Israel, producing weapons, or managing smuggling into the Strip in an orderly manner. But Hamas is still the dominant force in Gaza, it still has many cells that are capable of operating against the IDF, and it still holds Israeli hostages. It is also still able to prevent any external body that wants to manage and rehabilitate the Strip from doing so unless that body allows Hamas to de facto control the Strip. If Hamas remains in power in any deal to end the war in exchange for hostages, that is a surrender to Hamas. This would be Hamas's narrative: that it won the war. This will affect not only Gaza but the whole way Israel is perceived in the region.2025-08-14 00:00:00Full Article
Gen Amidror: Israel Has Been Managing the War Very Wisely
(X) Uriel Schachter - Former Israeli national security advisor Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror was interviewed recently on Ha'aretz's podcast. These were his main points: Let's start with the big picture: The war we are in was forced upon us on Oct. 7. Since then, the State of Israel has been managing it very wisely. First and foremost, by not being tempted by all sorts of proposals to expand the war simultaneously on several fronts. In the first stage, we dismantled Hamas as a military organization. It no longer exists as an organization, but it does exist as a bunch of cells that still operate in Gaza. Then, a little earlier than planned, we embarked on a war against Hizbullah. The Pager Operation turned out to be a great success, and almost all of Hizbullah's ability to fire at us was neutralized, and its leadership was destroyed. Following the fall of Hizbullah - and the weakness of Iran which was revealed in our attack in Iran in October - the Syrian regime fell. This happened because the forces around Syria realized that Assad was weak and sent the rebels to finish the job there. Finally, Iran gave us the opportunity to attack it, because it directly attacked us twice. As a result, we went on a very, very successful 12-day war in Iran. Today there is no central force in Hamas that is capable of managing the forces, gathering intelligence on the State of Israel, producing weapons, or managing smuggling into the Strip in an orderly manner. But Hamas is still the dominant force in Gaza, it still has many cells that are capable of operating against the IDF, and it still holds Israeli hostages. It is also still able to prevent any external body that wants to manage and rehabilitate the Strip from doing so unless that body allows Hamas to de facto control the Strip. If Hamas remains in power in any deal to end the war in exchange for hostages, that is a surrender to Hamas. This would be Hamas's narrative: that it won the war. This will affect not only Gaza but the whole way Israel is perceived in the region.2025-08-14 00:00:00Full Article
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