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(Royal United Service Institute-UK) Darya Dolzikova and Matthew Savill - More than a month after the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and scientists, the full extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear program remains unclear. Yet, the exact extent of the material damage is secondary. Iran does not have to reconstitute the whole of its program to be able to produce a nuclear weapon and could, in fact, probably do so relatively quickly, should it decide to. The more challenging question is over the impact of the "12-day war" on Iran's assessments and decision-making as to the value and feasibility of developing a credible nuclear deterrent. Recent developments have probably reinforced incentives for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon. The attacks have made painfully clear the ineffectiveness of Iran's other capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on its territory. In light of the Israeli degradation of both Hamas and Hizbullah and following the underwhelming performance of Iranian missiles, the limitations of Iran's "forward defense" strategy have become clear. However, intent to develop a nuclear deterrent is not sufficient. A single nuclear warhead - or even a small arsenal of nine or ten nuclear weapons - would not be a survivable deterrent. Such a small stockpile would be immediately targeted by Israel and, probably, the U.S. As the war demonstrated, Iran's air and missile defenses are unable to meet the requirements of defending Iran against a concerted Israeli attack. Darya Dolzikova is a Senior Research Fellow with RUSI's Proliferation and Nuclear Policy program. Matthew Savill is Director of Military Sciences at RUSI after a career at the UK Ministry of Defence. 2025-08-14 00:00:00Full Article
Will Iran Get the Bomb?
(Royal United Service Institute-UK) Darya Dolzikova and Matthew Savill - More than a month after the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and scientists, the full extent of the damage to the Iranian nuclear program remains unclear. Yet, the exact extent of the material damage is secondary. Iran does not have to reconstitute the whole of its program to be able to produce a nuclear weapon and could, in fact, probably do so relatively quickly, should it decide to. The more challenging question is over the impact of the "12-day war" on Iran's assessments and decision-making as to the value and feasibility of developing a credible nuclear deterrent. Recent developments have probably reinforced incentives for Iran to pursue a nuclear weapon. The attacks have made painfully clear the ineffectiveness of Iran's other capabilities to deter and defend against attacks on its territory. In light of the Israeli degradation of both Hamas and Hizbullah and following the underwhelming performance of Iranian missiles, the limitations of Iran's "forward defense" strategy have become clear. However, intent to develop a nuclear deterrent is not sufficient. A single nuclear warhead - or even a small arsenal of nine or ten nuclear weapons - would not be a survivable deterrent. Such a small stockpile would be immediately targeted by Israel and, probably, the U.S. As the war demonstrated, Iran's air and missile defenses are unable to meet the requirements of defending Iran against a concerted Israeli attack. Darya Dolzikova is a Senior Research Fellow with RUSI's Proliferation and Nuclear Policy program. Matthew Savill is Director of Military Sciences at RUSI after a career at the UK Ministry of Defence. 2025-08-14 00:00:00Full Article
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