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(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Olli Heinonen - In order for the nuclear deal with Iran to ensure the "exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program," the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be able to inspect all necessary locations either in the territory of Iran or under its control elsewhere, including all military sites. The absence of inspections at military sites prevents the effective monitoring of the deal, known as the JCPOA. Iran committed to apply the legally binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as well as the Additional Protocol (AP) as part of the JCPOA. Like all other countries subject to CSA safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran cannot declare any site to be a sanctuary off-limits to IAEA inspectors. Experience shows that Iran has often conducted nuclear R&D and manufacturing activities at military sites, so the IAEA would be remiss if it did not inspect them. The IAEA must fully exercise its rights and obligations in order to ensure the full and meaningful implementation of the JCPOA. The writer is former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards. 2018-04-05 00:00:00Full Article
The IAEA's Right and Obligation to Inspect Military Facilities in Iran
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies) Olli Heinonen - In order for the nuclear deal with Iran to ensure the "exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program," the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be able to inspect all necessary locations either in the territory of Iran or under its control elsewhere, including all military sites. The absence of inspections at military sites prevents the effective monitoring of the deal, known as the JCPOA. Iran committed to apply the legally binding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as well as the Additional Protocol (AP) as part of the JCPOA. Like all other countries subject to CSA safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran cannot declare any site to be a sanctuary off-limits to IAEA inspectors. Experience shows that Iran has often conducted nuclear R&D and manufacturing activities at military sites, so the IAEA would be remiss if it did not inspect them. The IAEA must fully exercise its rights and obligations in order to ensure the full and meaningful implementation of the JCPOA. The writer is former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards. 2018-04-05 00:00:00Full Article
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