Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Tablet) Shimon Peres - In the 1950s, the Arab world had made commitments to Israel's annihilation a litmus test for leadership; indeed, every Middle Eastern politician or general who hoped to ascend had to prove he was more intent on destroying us than his rival was. I believed that sowing doubt in their ability to actually do so was our highest security imperative. On Oct. 24, 1956, when the French and Israeli leadership were meeting to finalize the plans for Operation Suez, I approached French foreign minister Christian Pineau and defense minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury with an explicit request: to sell Israel a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes. To my utter surprise, they agreed. The purpose of Israel's nuclear program was not to fight a war, but to prevent one. It was not the reactor that mattered but the echo it generated. This was a different kind of security altogether. This was the security of knowing the state would never be destroyed - a first step toward peace that started with peace of mind. This is an excerpt from No Room for Small Dreams, Shimon Peres' posthumous autobiography.2017-09-15 00:00:00Full Article
How Israel Went Nuclear
(Tablet) Shimon Peres - In the 1950s, the Arab world had made commitments to Israel's annihilation a litmus test for leadership; indeed, every Middle Eastern politician or general who hoped to ascend had to prove he was more intent on destroying us than his rival was. I believed that sowing doubt in their ability to actually do so was our highest security imperative. On Oct. 24, 1956, when the French and Israeli leadership were meeting to finalize the plans for Operation Suez, I approached French foreign minister Christian Pineau and defense minister Maurice Bourges-Maunoury with an explicit request: to sell Israel a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes. To my utter surprise, they agreed. The purpose of Israel's nuclear program was not to fight a war, but to prevent one. It was not the reactor that mattered but the echo it generated. This was a different kind of security altogether. This was the security of knowing the state would never be destroyed - a first step toward peace that started with peace of mind. This is an excerpt from No Room for Small Dreams, Shimon Peres' posthumous autobiography.2017-09-15 00:00:00Full Article
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