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(Ha'aretz) - Moshe Arens In 1991, by the Gulf War's third week, the case for an Israeli military response had become very strong. After persistent Israeli demands, the U.S. was prepared to make good on the assurances given Israel prior to the war that if U.S. forces were unable to stop the Scud attacks against Israel, the U.S. would "stand down" west of an agreed longitude so as to clear the area for an Israeli military operation. Such an operation had been planned by the IDF, submitted by the General Staff for approval to the defense minister, and so been approved. The main reason why the operation was not carried out was that President Bush peremptorily declared a cease-fire during the fifth week of the war. 2003-03-18 00:00:00Full Article
Response and Deterrence
(Ha'aretz) - Moshe Arens In 1991, by the Gulf War's third week, the case for an Israeli military response had become very strong. After persistent Israeli demands, the U.S. was prepared to make good on the assurances given Israel prior to the war that if U.S. forces were unable to stop the Scud attacks against Israel, the U.S. would "stand down" west of an agreed longitude so as to clear the area for an Israeli military operation. Such an operation had been planned by the IDF, submitted by the General Staff for approval to the defense minister, and so been approved. The main reason why the operation was not carried out was that President Bush peremptorily declared a cease-fire during the fifth week of the war. 2003-03-18 00:00:00Full Article
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