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The Challenge of Containing Iran's Enrichment Activities

(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen - Officials are discussing possible compromises that might persuade Tehran to give up any ambition of developing nuclear weapons. Apparently, one of the principal components of these proposals is acceptance of Iran's right to enrich uranium to around 3.5%, a level suitable for civilian power reactors. But this could turn out to be a fatal bargain: centrifuge technology is easy to hide, and there are few barriers to continuing enrichment up to 90%, the level needed for an atomic bomb. If the aim is to produce 90% enriched uranium, reaching the 3.5% level requires some 75% of the work. By the time 20% enrichment is reached - the level Iran currently achieves - 90% of the work has been done. Therefore, cutting a deal in which Iran gives up enriching to 20% but continues enriching to 3.5% would buy relatively little time. A fundamental part of restoring international confidence in the peaceful scope of Iran's nuclear program is for Tehran to answer existing questions about suspect activities that suggest it has, at least in the past, worked on nuclear weapons designs and breached its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Simon Henderson is director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, formerly served as deputy director-general and head of the Department of Safeguards at the IAEA.
2012-04-17 00:00:00
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