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- Anat Kurz (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies-Tel Aviv University) * A major political-strategic objective of Hamas since its creation has been to institutionalize itself as an alternative to Fatah as the dominant force, first in the PLO and thereafter in the PA, as well. * In two rounds of local elections, in February and early May, Hamas gained about 30% of the votes, in part because the social welfare activities of Hamas winners in the first round gave a boost to Hamas candidates in the second round. While Fatah retained its overall primacy, the election results showed that it now faces a substantial force with considerable potential to do even better in the future, a potential that will be tested in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections scheduled for July 2005. * The process of democratization, to which the PA is committed, relieves Hamas of any further need for inter-organizational compromises in order to be legally incorporated into the national leadership. The democratization of the Palestinian political system - which is enthusiastically supported inside the territories and encouraged by Israel and the international community - will advance Hamas's goal. * Since Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement in March 2005 on tahidia ("calm"), there has been a steady rise in the incidence of attacks launched in and from the Gaza Strip - mostly in the form of Kassam rocket and mortar attacks on the western Negev - by Hamas operatives. * The incessant firing underscores the PA's reluctance to risk internal strife by enforcing a real ceasefire on Hamas or other organizations, including Fatah-affiliated factions. * While Hamas may accommodate the widespread Palestinian desire for some normalization of daily life and help to restrain acts of terror against Israel, it is unlikely to moderate its ideological platform in the foreseeable future, and a PA in which Hamas plays a central role will be an even more implacable political adversary for Israel. 2005-05-19 00:00:00Full Article
Consequences of Democratization in the Palestinian Authority
- Anat Kurz (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies-Tel Aviv University) * A major political-strategic objective of Hamas since its creation has been to institutionalize itself as an alternative to Fatah as the dominant force, first in the PLO and thereafter in the PA, as well. * In two rounds of local elections, in February and early May, Hamas gained about 30% of the votes, in part because the social welfare activities of Hamas winners in the first round gave a boost to Hamas candidates in the second round. While Fatah retained its overall primacy, the election results showed that it now faces a substantial force with considerable potential to do even better in the future, a potential that will be tested in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections scheduled for July 2005. * The process of democratization, to which the PA is committed, relieves Hamas of any further need for inter-organizational compromises in order to be legally incorporated into the national leadership. The democratization of the Palestinian political system - which is enthusiastically supported inside the territories and encouraged by Israel and the international community - will advance Hamas's goal. * Since Hamas and Fatah reached an agreement in March 2005 on tahidia ("calm"), there has been a steady rise in the incidence of attacks launched in and from the Gaza Strip - mostly in the form of Kassam rocket and mortar attacks on the western Negev - by Hamas operatives. * The incessant firing underscores the PA's reluctance to risk internal strife by enforcing a real ceasefire on Hamas or other organizations, including Fatah-affiliated factions. * While Hamas may accommodate the widespread Palestinian desire for some normalization of daily life and help to restrain acts of terror against Israel, it is unlikely to moderate its ideological platform in the foreseeable future, and a PA in which Hamas plays a central role will be an even more implacable political adversary for Israel. 2005-05-19 00:00:00Full Article
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