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Deterring but Not Defeating Hamas Allowed It to Grow Stronger

(Washington Post) Max Boot - In order to limit civilian loss of life in Gaza, a lot of well-meaning people in the West are calling for a cease-fire or suggesting that Israel should limit its response to Hamas to precision airstrikes and commando raids to take out high-level Hamas operatives and to free hostages. That advice is well-intended but ultimately misguided and futile. If Israel were to declare a cease-fire now, that would be tantamount to rewarding aggression and inviting more of it in the future. A narrowly focused counterterrorism strategy is being pushed by analysts who warn that Israel should avoid the kind of quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan that the U.S. found itself in after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. But there is a big difference in scale between Hamas now and al-Qaeda then. Al-Qaeda in 2001 had only 170 members, according to terrorism expert Peter Bergen. A few thousand other jihadists, who were not formal members, had been trained in its camps in Afghanistan. The 9/11 "planes operation" itself was carried out by 19 terrorists. The Oct. 7 assault on Israel, by contrast, involved an estimated 1,200 Hamas militants. The organization has 15,000-40,000 fighters in Gaza, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad might have 15,000 more. That makes Hamas closer to a conventional military force than a terrorist cell. It can't be destroyed by a small number of special operations forces, no matter how skilled. Nor can it be defeated from the air: There is no history of air operations proving decisive in warfare absent a ground component. If Israel were to rely on special operations raids and airstrikes, it would be reverting to the "mowing the lawn" strategy it followed for years of trying to degrade and deter, but not defeat, Hamas. The Oct. 7 attack revealed that policy's failure by showing that Hamas actually grew stronger and bolder after previous Israeli assaults.
2023-10-26 00:00:00
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