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(Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies-Tel Aviv University) Danny Rubinstein - * While the idea of a political discussion among the various Palestinian factions generally assumes twelve or even fourteen factions, most of them are small leftist organizations and fronts established more than thirty years ago. Consequently, during the last ten years, the debate between the Palestinian factions is in fact a dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. * As far as most Palestinians are concerned, and certainly from the Hamas viewpoint, the Sharon government drafted the disengagement plan solely because of the Palestinian violent struggle. They regard it as a tremendous Palestinian victory. All the opinion polls in the territories testify to this sentiment. Palestinian spokespeople share the view that this is an Israeli retreat, and the uprooting of settlements represents an Israeli national humiliation and a violence-induced surrender. * The sense of victory and Hamas strength allows the heads of the movement in the territories and abroad to adopt more flexible positions from a feeling that the possibility now exists to assume control of the Palestinian national movement and perhaps the governing authority of the West Bank and Gaza. The internal disputes in Fatah between the older veterans of Tunis, who control the movement's central committee, and the younger veterans of Israeli jails and the first intifada encourage Hamas activists to believe that their aim lies within their grasp. * It is very likely that Fatah will sustain a real blow in the elections. If this forecast comes true, we shall witness a real turning point in the Palestinian political scene. It is doubtful if Israeli policy can significantly influence the results of the elections and prevent Hamas from becoming an official partner in the Palestinian regime. In that case, we may witness a more antagonistic and violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation than we have known thus far. 2005-06-24 00:00:00Full Article
A Turning Point? The National Dialogue between Fatah and Hamas
(Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies-Tel Aviv University) Danny Rubinstein - * While the idea of a political discussion among the various Palestinian factions generally assumes twelve or even fourteen factions, most of them are small leftist organizations and fronts established more than thirty years ago. Consequently, during the last ten years, the debate between the Palestinian factions is in fact a dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. * As far as most Palestinians are concerned, and certainly from the Hamas viewpoint, the Sharon government drafted the disengagement plan solely because of the Palestinian violent struggle. They regard it as a tremendous Palestinian victory. All the opinion polls in the territories testify to this sentiment. Palestinian spokespeople share the view that this is an Israeli retreat, and the uprooting of settlements represents an Israeli national humiliation and a violence-induced surrender. * The sense of victory and Hamas strength allows the heads of the movement in the territories and abroad to adopt more flexible positions from a feeling that the possibility now exists to assume control of the Palestinian national movement and perhaps the governing authority of the West Bank and Gaza. The internal disputes in Fatah between the older veterans of Tunis, who control the movement's central committee, and the younger veterans of Israeli jails and the first intifada encourage Hamas activists to believe that their aim lies within their grasp. * It is very likely that Fatah will sustain a real blow in the elections. If this forecast comes true, we shall witness a real turning point in the Palestinian political scene. It is doubtful if Israeli policy can significantly influence the results of the elections and prevent Hamas from becoming an official partner in the Palestinian regime. In that case, we may witness a more antagonistic and violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation than we have known thus far. 2005-06-24 00:00:00Full Article
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