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Lessons and Consequences of the Israel-Hizballah War

[Washington Institute for Near East Policy] Jeffrey White, David Makovsky, and Dennis Ross - Jeffrey White: In a second round, Israel will seek an answer to the short-range missile problem and will hit harder, deeper, and faster, while Hizballah will seek to strike deeper, dig-in more deeply, and defend its high-value assets. David Makovsky: While Hizballah may be subjectively strengthened by surviving Israeli strikes, it is objectively weakened by the degradation Israel inflicted on the numbers of Hizballah's fighters and weapons. Dennis Ross: In 1993 and 1996, Israel failed to stop katyusha fire from Lebanon because of the mobility and small size of the rockets. That reality did not change in 2006, and it drove the timing of the eventual ceasefire just as it did in the past. Objectively, Hizballah is now far less capable militarily due to Israel's offensive operations. Subjectively, Hizballah is seen as a winner because the idiom of Arab political culture heralds resistance and not submitting. As the Lebanese military and multinational forces coexist with Hizballah, they will face the reality of Syrian efforts to resupply Hizballah, which is actively taking place. If there is no serious effort made to address the problem of resupply, it may become a flashpoint for future conflict. Changing the behavior of an emboldened Assad requires changing the calculus of what Syria stands to gain or lose by continued support for Hizballah. The U.S. and the Europeans should develop a common strategy that would inflict a serious economic cost on the Syrians. The Europeans, who represent the economic lifeline to Syria, should be prepared to impose a range of crippling sanctions, and the Bush administration should fully implement the Syrian Accountability Act for the first time.
2006-09-06 01:00:00
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