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Source: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20171025/106544/HHRG-115-FA13-Wstate-HeinonenO-20171025.pdf
The President's Iran Decision: Next Steps
(Foundation for Defense of Democracies-U.S. House of Representatives) Dr. Olli Heinonen - Dr. Olli Heinonen, former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of its Department of Safeguards, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday: To increase the likelihood that the JCPOA ensures the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program, there must be a far more robust and meaningful verification of the deal's provisions. To that end, several measures will be necessary. 1. The IAEA's quarterly reports on the deal's implementation must be enhanced. 2. The IAEA should complete the follow-up actions related to its investigation of the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of the Iranian nuclear program, including site visits and interviews with scientists. 3. The JCPOA and related agreements must apply to all sites related to the Iranian nuclear program, with no exceptions for military sites or any others. 4. Iran should ratify the Additional Protocol well before the sunset provisions take effect and before the IAEA issues a Broader Conclusion about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. 5. The UNSCR 2231 limitations on ballistic missiles should be extended to cruise missiles, while the restrictions on missile ranges and payloads should be lowered. 6. These and other measures should extend Iran's one-year breakout time indefinitely into the future, while enabling more effective enforcement. Iran's ballistic and cruise missiles tests have demonstrated a reach of thousands of kilometers. The growing range of Iranian missiles indicates Tehran's desire to go beyond pure deterrence. Experts at the UN Security Council have acknowledged that some of these missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Despite such cause for concern, the ballistic missile limitations set by UNSC Resolution 2231 expire six years from now, at most. This expiration would give Iran free rein to develop its missile capabilities about the time the JCPOA permits Iran to start expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities, which could generate fissile material for nuclear warheads. Thus, any effort to fix the JCPOA or negotiate a complementary agreement should provide for capping the range of Iranian missiles.