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Understanding the Hamas Takeover of Gaza

[Strategic Assessment-Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University ] Amir Kulick - On June 17, 2007, two days after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, Mahmoud Abbas appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the failure of the PA. Its report was published in February 2008. After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the Palestinian leadership under Arafat did not relate to the new entity as the seeds of "the state to come." There was no clear strategy for coping with Islamic movements, Hamas foremost among them. Ten small security forces were set up with the establishment of the PA, reflecting both the semi-military bodies that existed under the PLO and the internal rivalries among senior PLO officials. The forces' leaders acted based on a perception that the system is "a feudal-security territory and their private property." This perception had a severe impact on the functioning of the security forces in general, and during the crisis with Hamas this was reflected in a lack of coordination, organizational and internal weakness, and loss of direction. The report asks, "How is it possible that a force numbering over 50,000 people in a geographic area of slightly more than 300 sq. km., with experience, resources, and legitimacy, collapses before 20,000 militiamen?!" The answer the report offers is simple: in practice, no more than 10-15% of the armed force at the disposal of the Palestinian security apparatus took part in the confrontation. The most fundamental reason was the transformation of the apparatuses into "a social welfare organization." Over the years, membership in the security apparatuses was a way for the PA to fund its supporters. So, in the words of the committee, the security forces were turned into "no more than a facade" and "a system that was closer to a welfare organization with no military discipline, with no trained command, and with no positions or assignments." The committee stated, "the commanders had no control over their charges." The report cites "a preference for the family connection at the expense of the organizational commitment and military discipline." To this should be added the success of Hamas fighters in integrating into the PA's security forces and disrupting their functioning. Several of the bodyguards of force commanders were Hamas activists. The Presidential Guard was to spearhead the fight against Hamas, and in the months preceding the conflict it acquired substantial sums and equipment. Yet even before the Hamas assault, the commander of the Presidential Guard took off his uniform and went to the residential complex of the Egyptian delegation in civilian clothes, abandoning his post. "The Presidential Guard did not take part in the confrontation." The leadership that failed in handling the conflict with Hamas is still in place, the institutional system that is no less responsible for this failure has not been changed, and there are no signs on the horizon of this happening any time soon. Without a substantial, internal change within the PA and without a different national leadership, any arrangement reached between Israel and the PA in the foreseeable future is likely to remain an arrangement on paper only.
2008-06-27 01:00:00
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