Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Wall Street Journal) Editorial - For years, U.S. officials have insisted that the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr posed a negligible proliferation risk. Instead, they concentrated nearly all their attention on Iran's efforts to enrich uranium. Now it transpires that Iran removed the fuel rods at Bushehr in October, a mere two months after the reactor became fully operational. The transfer could have been a test run for the Iranians should they decide to reprocess those rods into weapons-grade plutonium for as many as 24 Nagasaki-type bombs. So much, then, for the notion that the Bushehr reactor is "proliferation resistant," since the IAEA is only permitted to inspect Bushehr once every 90 days. That means Iran could contrive an excuse to move the fuel rods without the agency knowing about it in time. 2012-12-06 00:00:00Full Article
From Bushehr to the Bomb
(Wall Street Journal) Editorial - For years, U.S. officials have insisted that the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr posed a negligible proliferation risk. Instead, they concentrated nearly all their attention on Iran's efforts to enrich uranium. Now it transpires that Iran removed the fuel rods at Bushehr in October, a mere two months after the reactor became fully operational. The transfer could have been a test run for the Iranians should they decide to reprocess those rods into weapons-grade plutonium for as many as 24 Nagasaki-type bombs. So much, then, for the notion that the Bushehr reactor is "proliferation resistant," since the IAEA is only permitted to inspect Bushehr once every 90 days. That means Iran could contrive an excuse to move the fuel rods without the agency knowing about it in time. 2012-12-06 00:00:00Full Article
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