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The Syria Temptation and Why President Obama Must Resist It

[Commentary] Bret Stephens - Condoleezza Rice reversed the Bush administration's efforts to isolate Bashar al-Assad's regime by inviting it to participate in the November 2007 Annapolis Peace Conference. But when it comes to the Syria track, the U.S. and Israel have walked down this road before, again and again, almost always with disappointing results. Just weeks after the failure of Israeli-Syrian talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, in January 2000, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara explained in a speech to the Arab Writers Union that Syria's interest in a negotiated settlement with Israel had nothing to do with actually coming to terms with Israel's right to exist, but rather that the recovery of the Golan Heights was merely a stage on the road to the destruction of Israel. Assad's government "believes that regaining the whole of Palestine is a long-term strategic goal that could not be implemented in one phase," said Shara. "[Our] doctrine draws a distinction between the different phases of the struggle for the liberation of Palestine." Among the more common misperceptions feeding the hope of persuading Bashar Assad to make peace with Israel is the notion that Damascus' alliance with Tehran is primarily one of convenience and inherently unnatural, since one regime is Arab, secular, and primarily Sunni, while the other is Persian, theocratic, and Shiite. Yet the relationship between Syria and Iran is in no danger of fraying. Rather, it has been deepening, and there is no reason to expect it will not continue to deepen. It is by no means clear that Syrian engagement would have any effect on the Tehran-Damascus alliance. Indeed, if the past five years of international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program are an indication, Tehran has learned that a sham interest in diplomacy is an excellent way to play for time and reap unreciprocated concessions without actually conceding on fundamentals. Though the Clinton administration's Mideast forays are now remembered as a hallowed period of robust and engaged American diplomacy, their achievements were relatively meager: The only lasting peace to emerge from the various processes was the one between Israel and Jordan. And that was the result of a strategic decision by King Hussein to which the Rabin government all but instantly acquiesced. Elsewhere, diplomacy proved to be an exercise in frustration and diminishing returns, purchased at a considerable cost to U.S. diplomatic capital and Israeli self-respect.
2009-03-06 06:00:00
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