The Abraham Accords and the Changing Shape of the Middle East

(Hoover Institution) Dennis Ross - As the lead U.S. negotiator on the Oslo and Arab-Israeli processes, I set up a number of discreet meetings between Israeli officials and their Gulf state counterparts in the 1990s. Most of the bilateral meetings involved security cooperation and built on intelligence contacts that Israel's Mossad had established. Security was the basis of these talks. In 2007, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice decided to launch an ambitious initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and presented the initiative to the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, fully expecting them to embrace and endorse her effort. To her surprise, the Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini, Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Omani leaders showed little interest in her initiative and instead made it clear that, in her words, they had three priorities: "Iran, Iran, and Iran." Israel shared the same priority and the reality of a strong converging strategic threat perception fostered deeper security cooperation. The fundamental point is that Arab leaders increasingly came to view cooperation with Israel as in their interests. As Arab officials told me, "Israel, unlike the U.S., isn't going anywhere" and "Israel actually acts and doesn't talk about it." Moreover, among the Gulf states, frustration with the Palestinians, especially their leadership, has become commonplace. In my trips to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, prominent officials assert their unwillingness to deny their country what is in its best interests for the sake of the Palestinians. The writer, who served in senior national security positions in four U.S. administrations, is the Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.


2022-06-23 00:00:00

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